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Abstract
This paper contributes to understandings of ecologically unequal exchange within the worldsystems perspective by offering a series of case studies of ecological modernization in the
automobile industry. The case studies demonstrate that “green” technologies developed and
instituted in core nations often require specific raw materials that are extracted from the
periphery and semi-periphery. Extraction of such natural resources causes significant
environmental degradation and often displaces entire communities from their land. Moreover,
because states often use violence and repression to facilitate raw material extraction, the
widespread commercialization of “green” technologies can result in serious human rights
violations. These findings challenge ecological modernization theory, which rests on the
assumption that the development and commercialization of more ecologically-efficient
technologies is universally beneficial.
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Popular and academic environmental discourses often endow technology with heroic powers.
According to such accounts, contemporary societies have the capacity to develop and
commercialize new eco-efficient technologies that utilize significantly fewer natural resources
and produce much less pollution per unit compared to previous generation technologies. Green
technology, these discourses assert, is developed and made broadly available through market
forces and/or government policies, and has the ability to pull societies back from the brink of
environmental and economic decline (see Salleh 2012). For instance, the president of the
Environmental Defense Fund, a large U.S. environmental organization, writes that a new
industrial revolution is on the horizon that “will almost certainly create the great fortunes of the
twenty-first century. But this new industrial revolution holds a more important promise: securing
the world against the dangers of global warming” (Krupp and Horn 2008: 1). Voicing a similar
sentiment, U.S. President Barack Obama stated, “all of us are going to have to work together in
an effective way to figure out how do we balance the imperatives of economic growth with very
real concerns about the effect we're having on our planet. And ultimately, I think this can be
solved by technology” (CBC 2009). Putting it more strongly, New York Times columnist Thomas
Friedman claims that the development of a “clean energy system” will “allow us to grow the
world’s economy—not only without exacerbating energy supply and demand issues,
petrodictatorships, climate change, biodiversity loss, and energy poverty—but by actually
reducing them at the same time” (Friedman 2008: 186).
Such treatment of technology does not only exist in popular environmental discourse, but
in certain academic discourses as well, particularly in ecological modernization theory.
According to one of the perspective’s founders, “the pivotal component of ecological
modernization is advanced technology” (Huber 2008: 360). Academic proponents of ecological
modernization argue that state regulation and tax regimes, market forces, consumer preferences,
and environmental movements propel technological innovation and implementation in ways that
diminish society’s impacts on the environment (Mol 2002; Mol and Spaargaren 2002; Buttel
2003; Cohen 2006; Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008). In this way, increasingly self-aware and
reflective modern societies have, according to ecological modernization theorists, the technical
ability to achieve long-term environmental sustainability and can do so without dramatically
altering or reforming today’s predominant social structures and processes (Mol 1996; Mol and
Janicke 2009). This central argument of ecological modernization theory rests on the
unacknowledged assumption that “green” technologies—developed and commercialized in core
nations—will benefit, or at least have the capacity to benefit, all people universally.
Expectations from a world-systems perspective are very different. Theorists drawing
from this perspective would conceptualize “green” technologies as commodities. As such, they
are derived from particular natural resources that exist in finite quantities in specific places
across the globe (Smith 2005). And, from a world-systems perspective, because “green”
technologies are commodities, they imply relations of inequality and exploitation (Marx 1994
[1867]). The social relations of particular concern here are of those between the comparatively
wealthy core and the comparatively poorer periphery and the semi-periphery. To world-systems
analysts, the economic development of the core came at the cost of the underdevelopment, social
disruption, and environmental degradation of the periphery (Bunker 1984). Taken together, this
means that while the widespread development of “green” technologies may create real benefits
in core nations, it may also produce further environmental degradation, violence, and social
disruption in peripheral zones. In other words, “green” technologies, like other commodities
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whose production and consumption spans the globe, are part and parcel to processes of
ecologically unequal exchange (see, for instance, Jorgenson 2006, 2009; Foster and Clark 2009).
In order to assess these different expectations, we examine three cases of technological
development in the automotive industry: catalytic converters, biofuels, and hybrid cars. In so
doing, we ask to what extent the utilization of “green” technologies in the cars and trucks of
wealthier nations inadvertently displaces, or might displace in the future, environmental harms
onto others. In a series of case studies we demonstrate that many “green” automotive
technologies require raw materials derived from the Global South and that the extraction of these
raw materials regularly results in devastating amounts of environmental destruction. Due to the
structure and operation of the world-economic system in which core nations have a privileged
capacity to obtain such materials for their own domestic use, ecologically unequal exchange can
occur even through processes of ecological modernization. The advancement of “green”
technologies therefore can produce very different outcomes for the core, periphery, and semiperiphery in today’s world.
To further consider the actual or potential impacts of ecological modernization, we also
contribute to a growing literature that attends to the ways state violence and repression facilitate
uneven global relationships. States act to violently dispossess people from their land, violently
suppress environmental protest movements, and otherwise curtail basic human rights in order to
promote and protect access to the natural resources—such as minerals, oil, and timber—that
constitute the basis of industrial technologies (Downey, Bonds, and Clark 2010). We contribute
to this literature by arguing that the widespread adoption of “green” technologies in core nations
would require significant amounts of raw materials derived from the Global South, facilitated
through continued violence and human rights abuses, thereby resulting in the further
underdevelopment of less wealthy countries.

Environmental and Social Costs of Ecological Modernization in the World-System
Ecological modernization is an influential theory that has received a great deal of attention from
social scientists. A fundamental component of ecological modernization theory is the prediction
that the adoption of new technologies such as shifts to renewable energy, “clean” technologies
that produce less pollution, and the use of low-impact chemicals will substantially lessen
societies’ impact on the environment (Mol 1997; Huber 2008; see also Hawken, Lovins, and
Lovins 1999). This means that, according to a second important premise of ecological
modernization theory, the economy and the environment have to some degree been “decoupled,”
meaning that increased future economic activity no longer necessarily requires increased
environmental degradation (Mol 2002). These two related principles rest on a third premise.
Because ecological modernization theorists argue that technological advancement in capitalism
can substantially lessen humanity’s impact on the environment, and so help avert an ecological
crisis, they assume that advancements in “green” technologies are neutral and universally
beneficial (see, for instance, Mol 1997; Huber 2008).
These interrelated premises, though fundamental to ecological modernization theory, are
strongly disputed by theorists and researchers from other perspectives. The argument that
increasingly efficient technologies will bring about increased resource conservation is one of the
most accepted “solutions” to environmental problems upheld by the corporate wealthy and
policy-makers because it offers a “magic bullet” that, according to the argument, will allow
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societies to manage the environmental crisis without social-structural changes or reduced
economic production (Foster 2002). Despite the popularity of this key ecological modernization
claim, many researchers argue that it simply is not true. Some have, for instance, called attention
to the so called “Jevons paradox,” named after the work of nineteenth-century political
economist William Stanley Jevons, whose study of coal usage led him to conclude that the
widespread use of technologies that improve efficiency actually increase—rather than
decrease—total natural resource use (Clark and Foster 2001). This paradox occurs because as
efficiency increases, an energy source becomes more affordable and increasingly available to
consumers (York and Rosa 2003).
For this reason numerous social scientists have disputed the idea that the economy and
the environment have in any way been decoupled in late modernity. The widespread
commercialization of more efficient technologies, by making natural resources less expensive,
can have the further effect of spurring economic expansion and thus increasing society’s total
impact on the environment (Clark and Foster 2001). Empirical tests using cross-national data
bear this point out, indicating that the environment and society have not been decoupled in late
modernity as highly developed and fully modern societies have not, as a whole, lessened their
environmental impacts in terms of their per capita ecological footprints (York, Dietz, and Rosa
2003; Jorgenson and Clark 2009a).
The implicit assumption that technological innovation is neutral and benefits all people
universally is at the very heart of ecological modernization theory. Nevertheless, it has not
received much critical attention. Because ecological modernization theorists do not focus on
issues of power, inequality, and domination, they tend to see technological innovation as the
outcome of value-neutral scientific imperatives. For these theorists, innovations in “green”
technologies are caused by the ongoing ecological rationalization of society, which is an
impartial and purely technical process uninfluenced by social relations (see Mol 1997 for one
example). These theorists rarely ask, for example, if a particular innovation in “green”
technology benefits one group of people more than others, or if some may be harmed by the
development and consumption of such technologies. Critical social scientists from numerous
different perspectives—including Marxist and neo-Marxists (Braverman 1974), environmental
sociologists (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994; Gould 2008), environmental anthropologists
(Hornborg 1992), feminist scholars (Wajcam 1991, 1994), and some scholars of science and
technology (Law 1991)—have long argued that technological development is profoundly social.
Those with greater power have an increased capacity to develop technologies that best suit their
interests at the expense of alternate technologies that may better suit other groups’ needs. Indeed,
power is often embedded in new technologies in ways that reproduce and even extend
domination. “Green” technological development, we argue, is no exception. This point will
become clear when placed in the context of global capitalism and ecologically unequal exchange
between nations.
The literature on ecologically unequal exchange emphasizes the historical context of the
core’s exploitation of natural resources in the periphery. During the colonial era, the material
infrastructure and economic growth of core nations depended upon access to the plentiful and
cheap raw materials of their colonies (Bunker 1984; Moore 2003; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005).
Consequently, European powers underdeveloped their colonies by extracting natural resources to
the point of depletion while creating a wake of environmental destruction and social upheaval
that inhibited – and continues to inhibit – more judicious economic and social development
(Bunker 1984). The legacy of colonial underdevelopment lives on today in the form of
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ecologically uneven exchange. Wealthy nations in the core – due to their greater economic,
political, and military power in the world-system – can externalize the environmental impacts of
capital accumulation onto the people of economically and politically weaker peripheral and
semi-peripheral nations (Jorgenson 2006, 2009). This ecologically uneven exchange occurs when
core regions extract and underpay peripheral regions for the energy and mineral resources that
fuel core industrial infrastructure (Hornborg 1992, 2001) and utilize the atmosphere, waters, and
ecosystems of peripheral zones to assimilate pollution and other waste produced in the core (Rice
2008).
It follows then that core nations may displace environmental harm on the people of
peripheral and semi-peripheral nations even in the name of environmental improvement (Pellow
2007). For instance, Sonnenfeld (2000) documents how the pulp and paper industry in Southeast
Asia adopted increasingly ecologically efficient technologies in response to civil society and
market pressures. While these new mills produce much less pollution compared to previous
generation technologies, they nevertheless are fueling deforestation in the region’s tropical
forests, prompting Sonnenfeld (2000: 254) to ask: “Is ecological modernization in advanced
industrial societies dependent upon increased materialization elsewhere?” Similarly, Frey (2006)
argues that environmental regulations and increased environmental protection in the world’s
wealthiest nations have created incentives for transnational corporations to move toxic and
hazardous production to poorer nations that have weaker environmental standards and limited
regulatory enforcement.1 Pellow (2007) provides complementary findings in his examination of
the toxic trade of electronic waste, in which corporations ship millions of tons of used and
obsolete electronic commodities from the United States and Europe to Asian and African nations
every year, resulting in massive transfers of highly toxic and deadly waste from the relatively
wealthy to the relatively poor.
The following evidence and analysis contributes to these accounts by explaining how
ecological modernization may result in ecologically unequal exchange between core and
periphery in another way as well: many “green” technologies developed and commercialized in
core nations are derived from raw materials that originate in the global South. The extraction of
these resources causes deforestation, contaminates local ecosystems, and displaces people from
their land. This paper also seeks to contribute to the world-systems literature by considering the
violence and human rights violations that may be unintended outcomes of processes of
ecological modernization.
While ecological modernization theory emphasizes the role of markets in advancing and
increasing the availability of “green” technology, world-systems analysts take for granted that
markets are created and maintained by the real or threatened violent action of states (Wallerstein
2005). Marx (1994 [1867]), for example, pointed out that many of the first labor markets in the
formative days of capitalism were created when peasants were violently dispossessed of their
land. Markets for raw materials, too, can hardly be thought of as “free” when states employ
violence to create and protect access. Recent scholarship has examined how state violence
contributed to ecologically unequal exchange in earlier eras, as colonial powers, through their
capacity for violence, transferred great amounts of natural wealth from the periphery to the core
while leaving tremendous environmental damage in their wake (Foster 1994; Moore 2003; Foster
and Clark 2009). Jorgenson and Clark (2009a) demonstrate that military power, or states’ ability
1

We acknowledge, however, that the desire to avoid higher production costs associated with stronger environmental
laws is not the only reason corporations shift production to the periphery. Such shifts may result in other cost
savings that are important to corporations, for instance savings in terms of labor costs.

“Green” Technology and Ecologically Unequal Exchange 172

to exert sustained violent force, is still strongly associated with a nation’s ability to consume the
natural resources of other lands. The United States’ recent war in Iraq is one particular case in
point (Foster 2004; Klare 2004).
In this paper we contribute to these accounts, but do not limit ourselves to the violence of
core nations. States in the periphery and semi-periphery may undertake a number of strategies to
promote domestic capital accumulation, including the use of violence and repression (Evans
1979). By violating citizens’ basic civil and political rights, repressive states attempt to lure
foreign investment by creating or sustaining a “good business climate” for multinational
corporations (Shandra 2007). Semi-peripheral and peripheral states may have powerful
motivation to do so. For example, such states may be highly indebted and so experience a strong
need to attract foreign investment; their government might depend on resource extraction for
revenue due to the legacy of colonial underdevelopment; state officials may stand to personally
gain from resource extraction; and due to the legacy of colonialism, these states are more likely
than core nations to be in conflict with rebel groups over the control of valuable resources. Such
violence and repression may take many forms. For instance, states in the periphery and semiperiphery may (1) censor public speech to prevent awareness of environmental degradation and
to otherwise inhibit the development of protest movements; (2) suppress environmental protests
with violent force; and (3) dispossess persons from their homes and farmlands through force or
the threat of force.
Such policies have profound environmental consequences, as they can dramatically
increase rates of natural resource extraction accomplished by multinational corporations, along
with the corresponding amount of environmental degradation it causes (Shandra 2007). By so
doing, peripheral and semi-peripheral state violence and repression contributes to ecologically
unequal exchange between nations in the world-system (Downey et al. 2010). Core nations, after
all, have developed their material economies, infrastructures, and military power by accessing
the natural resource wealth from the periphery. State violence in the periphery ensures that this
natural resource wealth can continue to be transferred in high enough quantities and at low
enough costs to contribute to capital accumulation and state power in the core (Downey et al.
2010). So, even while processes of ecological modernization may potentially contribute to some
increased environmental well-being in the core, state violence associated with resource
extraction for “green” technologies means that such extraction will be undertaken in ways that
create profound environmental and social disruptions in the periphery. In the remainder of this
paper we demonstrate the importance of attention in research and theory-building to inequality,
violence, and resource extraction in the production of “green” technologies in the world-system
through three case studies from the automotive sector.

Method
We attempt to provide a holistic understanding of the environmental and human consequences of
the widespread adoption of “green” technologies in the automobile industry by presenting three
case studies of the ecological modernization of the automobile: catalytic converters, biofuels, and
hybrid technologies.2 We constructed these cases by determining the natural resource origins of
these technologies, or, in other words, by determining what raw materials constitute these
2

The particular natural resources of interest include platinum group metals (catalytic converters); palm oil
(biofuels); and copper, nickel, rare earth minerals, and lithium (hybrid technologies).
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technologies and where they are extracted. We then conducted LexisNexis searches to
understand the environmental consequences of this natural resource extraction and to determine
whether or not states utilize violence to facilitate it.
We looked for potential violence associated with natural resource extraction on multiple
levels, including direct military or police action against anti-mine protestors or rebels; mine
security provided by military, police, or mercenary forces; state violations of widely upheld
human rights, like the right to speak about mine pollution; and the forced removal of local
residents to make way for an extractive development. Though the last two categories are not as
obviously violent as the other categories, we argue they should both be considered instances of
violence because they are intentional acts of deprivation committed by the state that are backed
by threatened or real force.
We instructed LexisNexis to search in major world newspapers printed in or translated to
English, and used search phrases such as “copper & Indonesia & violence,” “biofuel &
deforestation,” and “South Africa & protest & platinum.” We supplemented the archival searches
with internet research as needed, using websites from environmental nongovernmental
organizations such as “Mines and Communities” (www.minesandcommunities.org) and “Mining
Watch” (www.miningwatch.ca).
The research strategy we employed likely under-represents the environmental
degradation resulting from extraction/production of the natural resources in question and the
extent to which violence is used to facilitate it. First, it is likely that much of this environmental
degradation and many acts of violence associated with the extraction of the resources in question
escape the attention of the world’s largest newspapers printed in English—and even the attention
of anti-mining activists in Canada, the U.S. and the U.K.—due to language barriers and the
remote location of many mines. Moreover, many of the major producers of the natural resources
in question are countries (such as Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Russia)
in which the press and anti-mining activists enjoy limited freedom, making it less likely that
environmental degradation and violent actions associated with natural resource
extraction/production in these countries would show up in our search. With this caveat in mind,
we turn to the case studies.

Environmental and Social Consequences of the Ecological Modernization of the
Automobile
Our examination of the environmental and social consequences of ecological modernization
begins with the catalytic converter. American auto-manufacturers began installing catalytic
converters on their fleets in the 1970s in response to increasingly protective environmental laws
(McCarthy 2007). Consistent with the expectations of ecological modernization theory and its
optimism regarding “green” technology, the environmental benefits in the U.S. were significant.
Catalytic converters installed in automotive exhaust systems have reduced the amount of
hydrocarbons, carbon-monoxide, and nitrogen-oxide (a smog-forming pollutant) each car emits
by up to 90% compared to 1970 levels (McCarthy 2007). Altogether, the widespread
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implementation of the catalytic converter is “the single biggest step ever taken to reduce the
automobile’s environmental impact” 3 (McCarthy 2007: xvii).
Catalytic converters in the exhaust system of automobiles trigger chemical reactions that
transform toxic or harmful emissions into more benign compounds. They are effective because
of the remarkable chemical properties of a group of minerals called “platinum group metals” (or
pgms), which include platinum, palladium, and rhodium (National Research Council 2008).
Platinum and palladium are essential components for the reduction of hydrocarbon and carbon
monoxide emissions, and rhodium has no other commercially viable mineral substitute for the
reduction of nitrogen oxide emissions (National Research Council 2008).
The vast majority of pgms used in catalytic converters is extracted from mines in South
Africa and Russia (National Research Council 2008). While the widespread implementation of
catalytic converters has been extremely beneficial to American and European citizens whose
societies are structured around automobile transportation, as well as anywhere else catalytic
converters are required, an examination of pgm extraction in South African and Russia
demonstrates that it has not benefited all people equally.
In both South Africa and Russia, the environmental consequences of platinum mining
have been severe for local people. In the Limpopo region of South Africa, the construction of
platinum mines displaced local people from their farms and grazing land, destroying their selfsufficiency by eliminating their access to land over which they claimed historic ownership
(Curtis 2008). The platinum mines have also contaminated rivers and wells used by locals for
drinking water (Curtis 2008; Mathews 2008).
In Russia, the extraction of platinum group metals is also enormously destructive to the
environment. The majority of the world’s palladium, along with a great deal of the world’s
nickel, is produced by Norilsk Nickel near the city of Norilsk, which is located in Siberia above
the Arctic Circle. Norilsk is considered one of the most polluted places in the world (Walsh
2007) and the single largest source of acid-rain pollution (BBC 2007a). An estimated 1.9 million
tons of sulfur dioxide, a toxic pollutant, pour out of Norilsk’s smelters every year as a result of
its pgm and nickel smelting, more than that produced by the entire nation of France (Kramer
2007). Moreover, four million tons of heavy metals—which are chemically toxic to humans—are
released into the air each year. Perhaps not surprisingly, it is reported that Norilsk is surround by
an 18-30 mile “dead zone” where trees can no longer survive (BBC 2007a; Walsh 2007). So
much heavy metal has been released into the air by Norilsk Nickel in the sixty years it has mined
and processed pgms and nickel that entrepreneurs are now mining soot deposited from the
smelters to collect valuable, but also chemically toxic, heavy metals (Kramer 2007).
Platinum group mining is also strongly associated with violence and the deprivation of
people’s human rights in South Africa and Russia. In order to obtain platinum to install catalytic
converters on their 1975 fleet, General Motors and Ford looked to South Africa, where thousands
of miners were hired to work in apartheid conditions to meet the new demand (McCarthy 2007).
Perhaps of greater consequence, South Africa’s apartheid government was provided with an
important new source of revenue that soon rivaled gold (Feinstein 2005).
More recently the South African state has forced the relocation of 1000 households at
Mothotlo Village in order to make way for the multinational mining corporation Anglo

3

It should be made clear, however, that while the addition of catalytic converters successfully relieved important
sources of smog-forming pollution, it did nothing to address greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental
problems associated with car-dependent societies.
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American4 to create a new mine (Mathews 2008). When some townspeople in Mothotlo refused
to leave their homes, they were tear-gassed and forced from the area by armed police (Mathews
2008). When villagers protested their treatment, many were beaten and arrested (Curtis 2007).
South African police have violently suppressed other protests over platinum mining expansion,
in some instances shooting protesters with live and rubber bullets (Curtis 2007).
In Russia, the social costs associated with platinum group mining are also high. Norilsk’s
mines and one of its smelters were first built by forced labor in the Soviet Gulag5 (BBC 2007a).
The continued operations of the Norilsk mines and smelters are strongly associated with human
rights violations committed by the Russian state by limiting freedom of speech and freedom to
information. The Russian state manages the Norilsk region as a “closed” area, where journalists
need to obtain state permission to report there (Walsh 2007). Moreover, the Russian state has
denied researchers access to conduct long-term studies on the health effects of so much pollution
on the local population (Kramer 2007).
The above case illustrates that, while the widespread implementation of catalytic
converters into cars and trucks resulted in significant environmental improvements in the United
States and other nations where they are required, these benefits are not shared equally by all
people. Mining platinum group metals in South Africa and Russia has meant severe
environmental damage for the people there. Furthermore, the South African and Russian states
utilized violence and infringed on persons’ human rights in order to facilitate the mining. Taken
together, the case of catalytic converters indicates that environmental improvements brought
about by new technologies are not universally beneficial, but may disproportionately benefit
people in core nations at the expense of people in more peripheral zones.
Biofuels
Biofuels—alternative fuels from organic sources such as corn, sugar, palm oil, soy, or even
seaweed—were once widely heralded as a technical innovation that would dramatically reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles, while simultaneously eliminating U.S. and
European dependence on foreign oil (Krupp and Horn 2009). As such, they were “green”
technologies heralded as a means of eliminating many of the adverse environmental impacts of
oil-dependence in wealthy nations consistent with the expectations of ecological modernization
theory. Nevertheless, today much of their appeal has faded. Notable studies, for instance,
produced evidence that biofuels made from corn, soy beans, switch grass, or other crops may
actually increase carbon in the atmosphere due to the increased conversion of forests, savanna,
peat lands, and shrub lands—which tend to store carbon—into plantations and farms (Fargione et
al. 2008; Searchinger et al. 2008; UNEP 2009). In addition, the U.N. Food Program and
humanitarian organizations have criticized biofuel subsidies in wealthy nations, arguing that they
provide incentives for farmers to produce crops for fuel instead of food, thereby raising food
prices and contributing to hunger in the Global South (Rosenthal 2008b; FAO 2011).
In tropical countries, biofuel production creates essentially the same kinds of outcomes as
any other form of monocrop agricultural development oriented to external markets, including
deforestation and dispossession (Dauvergne and Neville 2010; White and Dasgupta 2010).
Specifically, biofuels derived from palm oil plants for markets in Europe have increased
environmental degradation and the likelihood of violence. Investigators working on behalf of the
4
5

This operation is being conducted by Anglo American’s subsidiary, “Anglo Platinum.”
This, however, was before the wide-spread adoption of catalytic converters in the U.S.
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government of the Netherlands, for instance, determined that the nation’s heavy importation of
biofuels from palm oil was contributing to massive deforestation in Malaysia and Indonesia
(Rosenthal 2007). In Indonesia alone, 9.4 million acres of rainforest have been cleared and
planted with palm oil since 1996, which is an area larger than New Hampshire and Connecticut
combined (Knudson 2009). Indigenous communities and small-scale farmers are also being
displaced by palm oil plantation developments. For example, the United Nations estimated that 5
million indigenous people may be displaced by palm oil development in Indonesia alone (BBCb
2007).
Both the Indonesian and Malaysian governments have facilitated deforestation and
displacement. In Indonesia, villages were bulldozed with no advance notice, at times under the
supervision and protection of soldiers (Green 2007; Knudeson 2009). State officials participated
in the eviction by threatening those who refused to leave with arrest (Knudeson 2009), in some
instances beating and even killing those who resisted (Green 2007).
In Malaysia, the Penan indigenous communities continue to lose the forests in which they
live due to new palm oil plantations. The Malaysian state has facilitated the expansion of palm
oil plantations through “bait and switch” techniques, granting approval for new or expanded
plantations on traditional Penan land while promising the Penan new “biosphere reserves” of
untouched forest elsewhere. However, due to rampant illegal and unpermitted logging and
plantation conversion, these “preserves” often have already been—or soon will be—decimated
as well (FOEI 2008).
The case of biofuels, made from palm oil in particular, cautions against purely technical
solutions to environmental problems. The case indicates that, in a highly unequal but highly
interdependent world economy, technical solutions like the production and adoption of biofuels
may unintentionally displace environmental harm to others, degrading whole landscapes while
displacing people—through violence or the threat of violence—from the ecosystems upon which
they depend. The widespread adoption and utilization of hybrid cars in wealthier nations poses a
similar threat to citizens of poorer nations with extractive-dependent economies.
Hybrid Cars
Hybrid vehicles, which utilize both electric motors and internal combustion engines, accounted
for almost 3% of 2010 U.S. auto sales (Mouawad 2010). A hybrid vehicle is able to achieve
remarkably improved efficiency compared to conventional automobiles because it primarily uses
its electric motor in stop-and-go city traffic, recharging its battery(s) each time the brakes are
applied (McCarthy 2007). The widespread adoption of hybrid vehicles, if replacing conventional
automobiles, could result in environmental gains for wealthy car-dependent nations by reducing
air pollution that kills thousands every year and that contributes to global climate change. For
instance, the Toyota Prius, which is the most popular hybrid on the American market, emits
ninety percent less smog-forming emissions and up to fifty percent less green house gas
emissions compared to the emissions of the average American automobile6 (Union of Concerned
Scientists 2009). Because the replacement of conventional automobiles with hybrid vehicles
could result in meaningful environmental savings for wealthy nations, such technologies seem to
be quintessential “green” technologies anticipated by ecological modernization theory.
6

While the widespread adoption of hybrid cars could result in very real environmental benefits, this is provided that
it does not simply result in more vehicles on the road and more total miles driven, as the Jevons Paradox would
predict.
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A full accounting of the costs associated with the widespread production of hybrid
vehicles must acknowledge, however, that it would require large quantities of specific mineral
resources that may increase rates of environmental destruction and military violence experienced
by individuals living near existing or future mines. Specifically, the electrical wiring,
rechargeable battery system, and electric motor of hybrid vehicles would utilize twenty-six
pounds (twelve kilograms) more copper than conventional vehicles, along with significantly
more nickel (National Research Council 2008). Copper and nickel mining has resulted in
substantial environmental degradation in the global South and many governments in nations
producing these minerals have proven willing to utilize violence to facilitate the minerals’
extraction. It is impossible to say to what extent these environmental and social costs would
increase with the mass adoption of hybrid vehicles, but any complete analysis of their potential
impact must at least acknowledge them and attempt to take them into account.
Copper mines are some of the biggest and most environmentally destructive mines on the
planet. The Grasberg mine in West Papua, Indonesia, which produces a substantial amount of
gold each year and is also one of the world’s largest copper mines and reserves, is a case in point.
The mine, owned by the giant multinationals Freeport-McMoRan and Rio Tinto7, has caused
tremendous environmental destruction, producing hundreds of thousands of tons of mine waste a
day8 (Perlez 2006). The total mine waste covers 90 square miles (Perlez 2006). The mine waste
is carried away by rivers into wetlands and estuaries, which at one time were some of the most
productive fisheries in the world. This pollution causes massive fish die-offs, and few-if-any fish
live in the polluted waterways today (Perlez 2005). The mine waste will remain dangerous for
decades to come because of acid leaching (Perlez 2005).
West Papuans have long argued that they have received little benefit from the mine while
nevertheless bearing the brunt of its environmental destruction, and have protested and rioted in
response (Perlez 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). Freeport-McMoRan and the Indonesian government
have worked hand in hand to protect the Grasberg mine and suppress an independence
movement that may threaten production. The Indonesian military has violently put down student
riots and taken student anti-mine/pro-independence leaders into custody (Perlez 2006a). The
military also polices and protects the mine itself (Perlez 2006b) and has been accused of rapes,
extrajudicial killings, and other human rights abuses to suppress the resistance of communities
living near the mine (Perlez and Bonner 2005). Finally, the Indonesian state works to keep West
Papua off limits to foreigners, including journalists (Perlez and Bonner 2005).
The corporate owners of the Grasberg mine have been accused of “purchasing” these
services from the Indonesian military. For example, Freeport gave at least $20 million in direct
payments to the military and police to protect the mine, though others believe the actual number
is much higher, in addition to spending another $35 million on military infrastructure, including
barracks, headquarters, roads, and vehicles (Perlez and Bonner 2005). Freeport and the
Indonesian military have also worked together to spy on environmentalists working to address
impacts of the Grasberg mine (Perlez and Bonner 2005).
In Peru, which holds some of the world’s most extensive copper reserves (USGS 2010),
the government utilized violence and the threat of violence to expropriate land to make way for
7

Freeport-McMoRan is a corporation based in the United States, while Rio Tinto has headquarters in both the
United Kingdom and Australia.
8
To give some sense of this, the total amount of copper produced throughout the world according to the USGS in
2006 was 1.7 million tons, which means that the Grasberg mine alone produces more mining waste in just a few
days than all the copper produced (and used) by the world in a year.
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the Tintaya copper mine, paying only an average of three U.S. dollars per acre to local farmers
and beating and forcibly removing individuals who refused to leave their land (Oxfam 2009a;
2009b). Police have since used violence to protect the mine, now owned by BHP Billiton, from
protesters demanding fair compensation for the land expropriation and the environmental
destruction caused by the mine (Herald Sun 2005). In response to protests at Tintaya and other
mines across Peru in 2005, then president Toledo signed a law criminalizing the disruption of
mining activities, which included a six year prison sentence for blocking roads to or from a mine
(Radio Mundo Real 2005).
Similarly, in the mineral-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the state and the
Anvil Mining Corporation utilized violence to protect copper resources. When several young
men in 2004 staged a bloodless uprising in the city of Kilwa, arguing for the need to direct the
wealth generated by the nearby Anvil copper mine to local people, Anvil flew approximately 150
DRC troops to the region (United Nations 2005). The company also provided the troops with
vehicles, drivers, food, and payments (United Nations 2005). Troops used the vehicles to drive to
Kilwa, which they recaptured without loss. Troops then conducted house to house searches,
arresting townspeople, beating them, and in some cases torturing and killing them. Up to 100
persons were massacred in the aftermath and many more were injured. Anvil’s vehicles were
further used to transfer captives, haul corpses, and transport loot taken from residents’ homes
(United Nations 2005).
In yet another example, the Ecuadoran state has also utilized violence to suppress
indigenous and environmental protests of a new law designed to spur large-scale copper and gold
mining. The state has forcibly removed anti-mine road blockades; used teargas to put down antimine protests; broken up press conferences given by indigenous groups; and arrested, imprisoned,
and beaten protest leaders—in one case killing a prominent anti-mine activist (Denvir 2009a;
Moore 2009). The Ecuadoran state also attempted to criminalize “Accion Ecologica,” Ecuador’s
leading environmental organization, by withdrawing its legal status (Denvir 2009b).
As previously noted, today’s hybrid vehicles also require greater quantities of nickel (for
their rechargeable nickel-metal-hydride battery systems) than conventional automobiles
(National Research Council 2008). Nickel mining and smelting produces severe and extensive
environmental degradation. It is also associated with a great deal of state violence and repression
in a number of producing countries. The Norilsk area, described earlier, is the single largest
producer of the world’s nickel (BBCa 2007) and is a case in point. Nickel mining in Indonesia,
which is the third-highest producing nation (USGS 2009), provides further evidence. The mining
multinational Vale S.A.9 produces 90% of Indonesia’s nickel and is responsible for large-scale
degradation of forest and agricultural land (Sangaji 2000). Vale S.A. mines nickel on land the
Indonesian state expropriated from small-scale farmers, including the Karonsi'e Dongi
indigenous people (Mining Watch 2005).
Mining in New Caledonia, a South Pacific Island claimed by France that possesses the
second greatest nickel reserves in the world (USGS 2009), also degrades the environment and
has resulted in state violence and human rights violations. The indigenous Kanack, native to New
Caledonia, have heavily contested Vale S.A.’s nickel project on the island, hoping to protect
fresh drinking water and the island’s fisheries (Mining Watch 2005). French military police have
violently broken indigenous blockades of the mine, at one point firing live ammunition at
protesters (Mining Watch 2005). Elsewhere on New Caledonia, the mining company Xstrata
plans to extract nickel by constructing one of the largest open-pit mines in the world (Mining
9

Much of Vale S.A.’s nickel extraction is conducted by its wholly-owned subsidiary “Vale Inco.”
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Watch 2008). It also intends to dredge a coastal barrier reef in order to develop a port to ship
minerals from the mine (Mining Watch 2008).
Guatemalans have also experienced environmental degradation and suffered state
violence in association with nickel mining. The Guatemalan state expropriated land for nickel
extraction from indigenous Q’eqchi’ people in the 1960s and 1970s, imprisoning and
assassinating community leaders who resisted (Mining Watch 2007). Today, the Guatemalan
state continues to protect this land through military force from Q’eqchi’ people’s attempts to
peacefully reoccupy their ancestral home and stave off the development of another nickel mine
(Mining Watch 2007).
It is important to note that we are not claiming that the violence associated with copper
mining in Indonesia and Ecuador, and with nickel mining in Indonesia, New Caledonia, and
Guatemala, is necessarily connected with hybrid vehicle production. However, because hybrid
vehicles currently use much larger quantities of these minerals compared to conventional
vehicles, the large-scale replacement of conventional autos with hybrids will increase demand
and likely exacerbate the environmental destruction and violence associated with copper and
nickel mining. The large-scale production of hybrids may increase demand for other minerals as
well, raising similar concerns. For instance, hybrid cars currently utilize an estimated 20
kilograms (44 pounds) of rare earth minerals for the rechargeable battery pack alone, far more
than that used in conventional vehicles (National Research Council 2008). Rare earth minerals
are mined almost exclusively in Inner Mongolia and Southeastern China. Inner Mongolia is a
mineral-rich area colonized by China, where pastoral Mongolians have long been targeted by
government repression (Sneath 2000) and, more recently, have been forcibly moved from their
land and resettled (York 2008). In Southeastern China, rare earth mines are “some of most
environmentally damaging in the country,” producing toxic and radioactive waste that
contaminates water and soils, destroying rice and aquiculture production (Bradsher 2009).
Furthermore, hybrid vehicle manufacturers may increasingly use lithium-ion batteries,
which are lighter-weight and have greater energy-storage capacities compared to nickelcadmium batteries. But here too increased demand might mean increased environmental
degradation and state violence, given that some of the world’s largest lithium reserves are found
in Chinese-occupied Tibet10 (Ladurantaye 2008). Colonized people rarely passively accept the
extraction of wealth from land they claim as their historic right, nor do they often passively
accept the environmental degradation that accompanies it (Geddicks 1992; Klare 2002). The
presence of large amounts of lithium in Tibet then, combined with the Chinese state’s
willingness to utilize violence to extract mineral resources, means that the widespread
commercialization of hybrid vehicles may pose increased hardships for the people of that region.
Taken together, these cases suggest that increasing demand for hybrid cars and, as a
result, increasing demand for certain minerals critical to their production will result in the
displacement of environmental harm across nations from the core to the periphery. If hybrid
vehicles largely replaced conventional vehicles in car-dependent wealthy nations, these nations
may produce less air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. It is no simple accounting practice
to determine if these gains outweigh the increased environmental degradation and human rights
abuses people living near copper, nickel, lithium, and rare earth mineral deposits would likely
10

The world’s largest lithium deposits are found in Bolivia’s high deserts, which may prove a boon to that nation’s
socialist programs (Romero 2009), or, conversely, may provide further incentives for the United States to intervene
in that region in various ways. Also of note, the U.S. has recently identified major lithium reserves in Afghanistan
(Risen 2010).
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face. The case of hybrid vehicle technology underscores the importance of placing inequality and
aspects of uneven development at the center of any analysis of the possible benefits and harms of
the widespread adoption of “green” technologies in the world-system.

Conclusion
In all of these cases, we demonstrate that the extraction of natural resources used in “green”
technologies in core nations is often accompanied by severe environmental degradation in the
periphery or semi-periphery. In some instances, as in the case of extraction for platinum group
metals in South Africa, this environmental degradation is local. In other instances, as with the
extraction of pgm and nickel in Russia or the creation of palm oil plantations in Malaysia or
Indonesia, the environmental destruction is extremely widespread. We further establish that
much of the extraction of natural resources used in “green” automobile technologies is associated
with state violence and abuses of human rights. In some of these instances, the violation of
human rights is in the form of restrictions on travel and free speech, as in Russia. In other
instances, the violation of human rights is much more severe—involving direct violence,
dispossession, and sometimes death—as in Indonesia, South Africa, Malaysia, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. While documenting associations between the extraction of
natural resources that may be used for “green” technologies in the core and human rights
violations and environmental degradation in peripheral regions of the world does not prove
causation, it does provide a useful theoretical exercise that contributes to understandings of
ecologically unequal exchange within the world-systems perspective, while also adding to
existing critiques of ecological modernization theory.
The extraction of critical raw materials for “green” technologies and their transfer from
the relatively poor to the relatively wealthy constitutes a variety of ecologically uneqal exchange.
Because core nations have a privileged position in the world-system due to the strength of their
economies, their military power, and the functioning of international financial institutions and
trade agreements, they are able to utilize peripheral and semi-peripheral regions as sources for
raw materials and as pollution “sinks.” The structure and operation of the world-system means,
therefore, that processes of ecological modernization in the core, which might result in real
domestic environmental improvements as in the case of catalytic converters, can displace
environmental harm onto the people of less economically and politically powerful regions of the
world.
The evidence presented in this article adds to a growing body of work that shows that
state and corporate violence in the periphery contributes to ecologically unequal exchange,
resulting in transfers of natural resource wealth to the core without a full payment for their value
and cost of extraction (Shandra 2007; Downey et al. 2010). In order to prevent or overcome
opposition to mining or other types of resource extraction, states may impede people’s right to
free expression, may criminalize or forcibly put down protests, or remove people from their land
through force or threat of force. Significantly, the association between violence and natural
resource extraction for materials used in “green” technologies in the periphery means that
members of impacted communities have a diminished capacity to protect themselves and their
environment in the face of ongoing extractive projects, or to pressure corporations to initiate
more ecologically judicious extraction techniques in the future. This means that state violence to
facilitate natural resource extraction in the periphery will likely result in continued or increasing
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environmental degradation in those regions of the world, even when these resources are used for
“green” technologies in the core.
These analyses raise important questions for ecological modernization theory. Other
social scientists have disputed the idea that efficiencies created by new technologies can
significantly improve capitalist societies’ relation with the environment. While new technologies
may result in increased efficiencies, the “pace of eco-efficiency” is likely not enough to
compensate for the ever-increasing resource use and waste production of a society structured
around the unlimited accumulation of capital (York and Rosa 2003). Quite the contrary,
increases in efficiency can actually mean increased resource use by making raw materials less
expensive and therefore more widely available (Clark and Foster 2001). This paper adds to these
critiques by establishing that whatever benefits may accrue from advancements in eco-efficient
technology, they are far from universal. Rather, in a world torn by deep inequalities, the
widespread commercialization of “green” technologies has the potential to create new, more
serious, or at least different environmental and humanitarian problems for less wealthy and less
powerful groups of individuals across the globe.
In addition to raising the empirical question about relative costs and benefits from
advancements in “green” technologies for people in the core, periphery, and semi-periphery, this
paper challenges the very conceptualization of technology in ecological modernization theory.
Ecological modernization theory tends to conceptualize technological development as the end
result of rational-scientific imperatives. Technology is, according to ecological modernization’s
treatment, neutral and beyond the influence of social relations. However, there is a long-standing
tradition of research that consistently demonstrates the profoundly social nature of technological
development (Wajcam 1991, 1994; Hornborg 2001; Gould 2008). Those with disproportionately
more power in a society, according to this literature, have a greater capacity to develop
technologies that best serve their interests at the expense of other people and at the cost of other
potential technologies that may better serve other groups’ needs.
The cases presented in this paper demonstrate that “green” automotive technologies are
far from neutral. They are commodities that imply particular social relations both between people
and between people and the natural world. Like all commodities, the “green” technologies
examined here are comprised of specific minerals, the extraction of which benefits some while
often subjecting others to environmental degradation and state violence. Unlike other
commodities, however, “green” technologies are often upheld as a solution to the ongoing
ecological crisis of capitalism.
While we do not doubt the technical genius of humanity, nor that improved and more
efficient technologies can play a part in addressing the ecological crisis, we maintain that
technical fixes alone cannot solve environmental problems. Inequality—between both people
and nations—matters a great deal. Technical “solutions” by themselves, in a highly unequal
world, may solve very little for the world’s poor. More likely, such “solutions” will further
degrade their environments while exposing already marginalized groups to increased levels of
violence and military force—all while presenting a new justification to maintain the status quo.
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